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I
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

GLADYS P. HENDRICKS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BRIGHAM VICTOR HENDRICKS,
Defendant.

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

Case No. 7893

FILED
"'g . .· .
L
0 .--t-G~"'l

I ::._:

L. E. NELSON,
· ----------------------------Attorney for Plaintiff
Clerk, Supreme Court~ ....Ut~- . . and Appellant.

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for Cache County.
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IN THE SlJPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GLADYS P. HENDRICKS,
Plaintiff,

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF

vs.
BRIGHAM \ 7 ICTOR HENDRICKS,
Defendant.

Case No. 7893

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Pocatello,
Idaho, on June 30, 1943. ( Tr. 10). This is a second marriage for both parties. Each of them have children by a
previous marriage. (Tr. 10). The defendant is 57 and
plaintiff is about the same age. ( Tr. 83). At the time
the parties herein were married, plaintiff resided at Logan,
and defendant resided at Lewiston, Utah. Plaintiff had
her furniture moved to defendant's ho~e at Lewiston, and
they lived there until July, 1946. (Tr. 12-13 ).
During the first year, defendant asked plaintiff to lend
him $1,300.00. (Tr. 30). In order to comply with his
request and not having the money available, she made a
bank loan of $1,300.00, to be re-paid in monthly payments
of $50.00. ( Tr. 56). Some time later, defendant re-paid
$200.00, but failed to repay the balance of $1,100.00.
(Tr. 30).
3
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The record reveals that during the second and third
years ( 1945-1946), defendant began to absent himself
from their home for brief intervals, going away in his car,
and remaining away for two or three days, without informing plaintiff of his intentions before leaving, and upon
his return home he refused to inform plaintiff where he
had been. (Tr. 15-17, 24-25). The defendant's conduct
became progressively worse during the third year of their
married life, with respect to leaving home without informing plaintiff where he was going or where he had been,
·(Tr. 24-25) and he also refused to take the plaintiff into
his confidence with respect to what he was doing with his
farm income. Defendant continued to leave home and
remain away for several days at a time, and frequent quarrels ensued between the parties. ( Tr. 24-25). Since defendant was a farmer and had no reason to make these
trips, and wh.en he refused to take plaintiff into his confidence, plaintiff became worried and upset. (Tr. 25).
During the second and third years of their marriage,
partly because of the fact that the defendant would not
purchase groceries or pay for groceries that plaintiff purchased, and partly because of the fact that he was frequently away from home for several days at a time as hereinbefore stated, plaintiff was compelled to use her money
for groceries and household incidentals, and this condition
continued more or less during the second and third years
of their marriage and it became gradually worse. (Tr. 1416).
The defendant ~ecame very indifferent with respect
to offering to support the plaintiff, and considerable controversy arose between the :parties because of his failure
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to support her, in view of the fact that he was operating
a large farm and presumably had a good income. During
1945 and 1946, the plaintiff was also pestered with bill
collectors who called on the telephone and also cam~ to
the house to collect bills against the defendant, and which
annoyed the plaintiff considerably. (Tr. 18-19, 23-24). ·
In July, 1946, defendant invited plaintiff to accompany him to the Bear River State Bank at Tremonton, where
he was then banking. Mter they arrived there, plaintiff
was surprised to learn that defendant had lured her there
to sign a note and mortgage for a loan, in order, as he
explained to enable him to buy cattle for his son Sidney,
so that the latter could engage in the cattle business.
( Tr. 50-51). In view of the fact that defendant then owed
a considerable number of old bills, had trouble with the
Lewiston State Bank, (Tr. 23) and had failed ·to re-pay
plaint££ the $1,100.00, which he had previously borrowed
from her, (Tr. 30) and moreover was not producing an
income from a very good farm, she refused to sign the
note, and as a result thereof, the defendant became very
resentful with the plaintiff, and on the return trip. from
Tremonton he exhibited a quarrelsome attitude (Tr. 23}
and, after arriving home they continued to quarrel all day.
(Tr. 25). The plaintiff then concluded that she and the
defendant could not live together with any degree of harmony, happiness or success, so she decided to· pack her
things and furniture and move hack to Logan. Tr. 25).
When plaintiff separated from defendant in
1946, she returned to Logan and lived temporarily
her daughter and son-in-law. Shortly thereafter,
moved to Preston, Idaho, and plaintiff purchased

July,
with
they
their
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home. (Tr. 26-27). Meanwhile, during the late summer
and early fall of 1946, defendant visited the plaintiff at
Logan more or less frequently with a view of reconciliation, and during September or October, 1946, they resumed cohabitation and lived together in plaintiffs home
in Logan. (Tr. 26).
The record reveals ( Tr. 31-34) that dissention again
arose between these parties during the winter of 1946-47.
On or about F·ebruary 19, 1947, plaintiff consulted attorney
Dobbs at Ogden, ( Tr. 33) and as a result of her visit,
Dobbs communicated with defendant by letter, advising
him of plaintiffs visit and requesting defendant to call at
Dobb's office (Pl. Ex. F.). About that time defendant
was intending to sell the 80 acre tract of land, and in view
of his lack of support for the period of their marriage,
plaintiff refused to sign the deed, without a support agreement; and in consequence whereof the parties hereto,
executed this agreement (PI Ex. D.) of February 29, 1947,
which called for repayment of loan made by plaintiff to
defendant in 1944, upon which $1,100.00 was owing.
Tr. 30). And, because defendant had failed to support
the plaintiff or me~t ~he ordinary household expenses,
plaintiff desired to. fortify her position by requiring de.fendant to agree in writing, to provide $100.00 a month
"as an allowance for home and personal use," (Pl. Ex. D.
Tr. 34) and when defendant executed the same on February 27, 1947, plaintiff signed the deed to convey the 80
acre tra<Ct. But after the deed was executed, defendant
refused and neglected to pay plaintiff the monthly allowance of $100.00 Tr. 34) and also the $1,100.00, owing on
the note.
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-In describing defendant's conduct towards plaintiff
since their reconciliation in fall of 1946, the record discloses: {Tr. 34).

Q. From 1947 up to the time you filed your complaint
in this action, did you live "vith the defendant during that
period of time? A. Off and on. Q.. What. do you mean

by "off and on?'' A. Well, he'd get into tantrums and if
I wouldn't do everything he wanted to do he'd go for two
or three weeks, and last summer he left for three months
and didn't support me. He left me without any money
or anything like that, and sometimes he's gone a week and
sometimes three or four days. You never know. ( Tr. 34).
Q. And then you had your final separation just about the
time this complaint was filed, did you not? A. Yes.
Q. And "vhat led up to that, ~1rs. Hendricks? A. Well,
his staying out nights, not coming home. He'd leave four
or five o'clock in the morning and wouldn't get home until
two, four, five o'clock in the morning. Things like that.
Q. The next morning?. A. Yes. Sometimes he wouldn't come at all. He didn't support me. He gave me some
money but not very much, and he wrote bad checks right
and left. Q. And did people contact you with respect to
these bad checks? A. They certainly did. Q. By telephone or in person? A. Some in person, some by tiephone. Q. And how did that affect you, Mrs. Hendricks?
A. It disturbed me terribly.
Q. Had you been accustomed to that? A. Never. (Tr. 35). Q. Now fll
ask you this general question, Mrs. Hendricks. During this
period since about September or October of 1946 up until
the time this action was filed, in a general way have you
been able to get along very well with the defendant? A.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In a general way I'd say no, and it's been mostly money
matters all the time with us. Q. Has that affected your
health and your well-being? A. Well, yes, it's been a lot
of worry ·and trouble with it all through my married life.
Q. Have you had quarrels with the defendant as a result
of his conduct? A. Yes. Q. And have they been frequent? A. Yes. Q And has that affected your wellbeing and peace of mind? A. Certainly it has. (Tr. 37).
Q. Mrs. Hendricks, from your experience with the de-:
fendant, do you know now or do you believe you could
live with him with any degree of success? A. No. Q.
You think it would affect your health if you were living
with him? A. That and my sanity. (Tr. 44). (Emphasis supplied).
Plaintiff testifed that defendant became intoxicated
quite frequently during the time she lived with him. ( Tr.
137). He "\Vas arrested for drunken driving at Smithfield,
Cache County, about December 20, 1948, by Highway
Patrolman Ed. Pitcher. This occurred during the nighttime. Defendant admitted his plea of guilty to this charge
and payment of a $100.00 fine, (Tr. 160-161) and his
driver's license was revoked for the duration of one year.
(Tr. 137-138).
Sometime in the year 1950, the defendant was driving
his car easterly on second north street in Logan, about
midnight, in what two Logan Police Officers, who were
followipg him, considered to be in an unlawful manner.
(Tr. 130). They stopped him and took him home, leaving
his car parked at second north and main streets. ( Tr. 131).
Officer Ray Jones testified that, "We thought it best to
take him home and not let him drive at the present (that)
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thne." (Tr. 130). After arriving at plaintiff's home, plaintiff and defendant engaged in an argument, so the officer's
took defendant in their car and they rode around for a
considerable length of time and, until they considered that
he was sober enough to drive his car home. ( Tr. 131).
On this and other occasions defendant seemed to be under
the influence of something, whether liquor or something
else. Defendant admitted to plaintiff that he had smoked
marjuana on several occasions. ( Tr. 187).
When these parties were married, plaintiff owned an
interest in the family home and in the sale thereof she
received as her share $1,200.00. She also owned the business property on main street in Logan, from which she
received a monthly rental of $125.00. The taxes on this
property amounted to about $25.00 per month. (Tr. 57).
Thus she had about $100.00 clear above taxes. When defendant loaned $1,300.00 from plaintiff in 1944. ( Tr. 30)
she borrowed this amount from her bank for him and repaid it in monthly payments of $50.00. Plaintiff testified
( Tr. 57) this amount, "all went for our living, Vic (the
defendant) had the money and one way or the other it
went for our living." ( Tr. 57). Thus it appears that the
said rental of $100.00 from July 1, 1943, to the time the
property was sold on October 31, 1946, amounting to
$3,600.00, was used to pay off defendant's loan and for
household support, and the $1,200.00 received from her
interest in the home, all amounting to $4,800.00 was spent
by plaintiff directly for defendant's benefit.
When plaintiff and defendant separated in the summer of 1946, she had no home in Logan, so she purchased
the home in which she is now residing. And in order to
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10

purchase the same it became necessary to sell her business
property, which was sold in October, 1946, from which
sale she received the net amount of $21,065.00, ( Tr. 28).
Plaintiff paid $6,000.00 for the home, ( Tr. 27) and approximately $3,000.00, for interior painting, wallpaper, carpets, drapes and remodeling, or a total of $9,000,00. She
paid $2,750.00 for a car and at the time of trial she had
two war bonds of net value of $1,640.00, or a total of
$13,390.00. When this amount is subtracted from $21,065.00, it leaves balance of $7,675.00 which amount was
expended by plaintiff for household expenses between
October, 1946, and March 1, 1952, when this action was
filed. When $7,675.00 is added to $4,800.00 it will be
seen that plaintiff contributed $12,475.00, toward supporting herself and defendant during their married life of 8
years and 8 months. And the evidence will show that
defendant lived upon the plaintiff's income which is definitely proven by plaintiff's checks, and her bank statements offered and received in evidence. And ·defendant
has not denied that the above amount was spent for family
and household expenses.

a

Defendant has farm property at Lewiston, consisting
of 154 acres of good irrigated farm land valued at $350.00
per acre with improvements. (Tr. 4, 5). He also has
certain warehouse property located near his borne which
he values at about $1500.00. ( Tr. 170). Thus the real
property according to a conservative value would be approximately $55,000.00. In January 1951, the defendant's
boys intended to purchase this property, including all
machinery and equipment and defendant then fixed the
sale price at $68,000.00. ( Tr. 41). The mortgage indebt-
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edness at time of trial was $20,400.00. (Tr. 4). Defendant had two tn1cks in which he had an equity of about
$4,000.00. (Tr. 167-168 ). He also had a 1950 model
Chevrolet. The farm without improvements is rented for
the current year at a cash rental of $5,000.00, and the property taxes are approximately $600.00. (Tr. 164). D~e
fendant is receiving a net rental income this year o.f
$5,400.00 (Tr. 164).
The foregoing statement covers most of the pertinent
facts in the case, however, if any facts have been overlooked, they will likely be covered in the discussion of the
evidence in the several points raised.
The plaintiff brought this suit asking:
1. For a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage
contract.
Awarding to plaintiff the expenditures made for
household support in the sum of $12,475.00.
2.

3. For a reasonable property settlement or, in lieu
thereof a reasonable alimony.
4.

Reasonable attorneys fee.

5. Costs of suit.

Statement of Points Upon Which Appellant .Intends
to Rely for Reversal of Judgement and Decree.
1. The Court erred in making it's findings of fact
number four, it's conclusions of law and decree that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed on the merits with prejudice.

(R. 7, 8, 9 ).
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2. The Court erred in making it's findings number
five, "That each of said parties were guilty of crimination
and recrimination, one against the other," (R. 7) because
there is no ple~ding or evidence to support the same.

3. The Court erred in striking the plaintiff's testimony and evidence. (Tr. 218-235).

The Court erred in· refusing to award to plaintiff
alimony and a property settlement, and in making the following portion of finding number three, viz,- "and used
the proceeds thereof mostly for her own use and benefit."
(R. 7, 8, 9).
4.

5. The Court erred in refusing to award plaintiff's
attorney a reasonable fee. ·

ARGUMENT
Point 1. The Court erred in making it's findings of
, fact number four, it's conclusions of law and decree
that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed on the merits
with prejudice. (R. 7, 8, 9).
It is yery apparent from the courts oral findings made
at the conclusion of the trial on June 9, 1952, that plaintiff
had proven a case against the defendant on the grounds
of cruelty as alleged in her compl~int, as will appear from
the following oral findings made by the court:
"The court feels that a divorce should be granted."
(Tr. 206).
"The court f~ds the parties can never live .together and that a divorce should be granted." (Tr. 207)
The court further found:
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"If I can do it legally I want to grant them both
a divorce, or I want to grant a divorce without referring to who gets it." xxx 'but on the whole case it does
appear there should be a divorce." ( Tr. 207).
From the foregoing findings it definitely appeared
that the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to entitle her to a divorce, but the court apparently did not want
to create the enmity of the defendant.
It also appeared that the court did not want to assume
the task of making a property settlement which plaintiff
included in the prayer of her complaint. In this connection reference is made to the following oral finding, made
by the court on June 23, 1952.
"Can I grant both parties the divorce or can I
grant a divorce without referring to who gets it? That
becomes important, as you will appreciate, because
the court has in mind making certain property orders,
and if I grant her a divorce I feel compelled to do
certain things I wouldn't otherwise do. I won't grant
either party a divorce. It's a question of granting
both of them a divorce or dismissing the proceedings
on the merits, both of them being guilty of such acts
of a criminal nature that the ·court cannot conscientiously grant a divorce to one side and brand one party
as a guilty person and embellish another one as a
lilywhite person entitled to a kind of relief this court
should grant. So please do some research. If I have
a chance I,ll grant a divorce to both parties. Whether
I can do it or not I don,t know.,, ( Tr. 207). Italics
added.
On June 23, 1952, in open court, the court made the
following statement:
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"Let the record show that both counsel are now
present, as well as Mr. Hendri~cks. Mr. Nelson, as I
indicated heretofore, unless somebody wants to suggest a stipulation or something, I'm going to direct
Sjostrom to prepare findings of fact and conclusions
of law and decree dismissing both the complaint and
the counterclaim on the merits with prejudice. But
if counsel care to make a suggestion to the court, or
if you want.to make a stipulation I'll grant a divorce to
both parties against each other." xxx "What I would
like to do is grant a divorce to both parties. They
both have children, and there might be some ego advantage to each party to feel that they had each won
the case. But in view of the dearth of authorities
under which I dare do that, I won't do it unless you
stipulate to it.'' (Italics added).
When the parties could not agree upon a property
settlement, the court entered it's formal findings, conclusions and decree on July 31, 1952. (. 7, 8). In paragraph
two, the court finds as follows:
"That since about the month of May, 1944, defendant has treated plaintiff cruelly, causing her great
mental and physical distress, as follows: "That said
defendant has frequently become intoxicated, has frequently stayed away from home overnight without
just cause, has exchanged "mash" notes with women
friends, once or twice has threatened to do bodily
harm to the plaintiff, all of which actions has caused
the plaintiff great mental distress."

an

As
apparent offset to the foregoing findings, the
court's finding number four is as follows:
"That since said marriage the plaintiff has also
been guilty of cruel treatment of defendant, to the
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extent of causing defendant great mental distress and
travail, in this: That said plaintiff has been a frequent
user of of intoxicating liquors, that she deserted and
abandoned the defendant's domicile and residence at
Lewiston and moved to Logan without just cause and
excuse, that she wrongfully refused to sign a mortgage
to the Bear River State Bank at Tremonton, which
mortgage was asked for in good faith by the defendant
in furtherance of his business, that plaintiff wrongfully accused the defendant of being a drug addict to
a certain police officer of Logan City and attempted
to have the defendant incarcerated and jailed on that
charge.''
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
making finding number four in view of the fact that the
court had already entered it's finding numb~r two, which
entitled the plaintiff to a divorce from the defendant.
From an examination of the record, it w~ll be seen that
there is no substantial evidence upon which the court
could make the findings contained in number four. There
is no evidence in the r'ecord that plaintiff has been a frequent user of intoxicating liquors. There is no evidence
in the record to prove that plaintiff deserted and abandoned the defendant's domicile when she moved from Lewiston to Logan, in July of 1946. Plaintiff's testimony is to
the effect that for two years immediately prior to that
time, defendant had treated plaintiff cruelly and things
were going from bad to worse. (Tr. 15-17, 24, 25). And
moreover, the evidence shows that within three months
after plaintiff left the defendant as aforesaid, they became
reconciled and lived and cahabitated together as husband
and wife. (Tr. 26). Thus defendant condoned whatever cruelty, if any, theretofore existing between the parties. And
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assuming, but not conceding, that plaintiff wrongfully re- .
fused to sign a mortgage to the Bear River State Bank,
which was prior to their separation in July, 1946, upon the
aforesaid reconciliation thereafter between the parties,
(Tr. 26) plaintiff's refusal to sign said mortgage was also
condoned. There is no testimony in the record that plaintiff accused defendant of being a drug addict. The undisputed testimony on this question was testified to by
the police officers. The officers were called to plaintiff's
residence because defendant was creating a disturbance
there. On another occasion when defendant was found
driving easterly on second north street in Logan City on
the lefthand side of the street by two police officers, he
was taken into custody by them and taken to his home.
The plaintiff as well as the officers observed that there
was something wrong with the defendant on that occasion.
( Tr. 130). There is absolutely no testimony in the record
that plaintiff at any time, attempted to have the defendant
incarcerated and jailed.
However, the court seemed to overlook the fact that
the defendant was arrested at Smithfield and charged with
driving his automobile while under the influence of liquor.
To this charge defendant entered a plea of gl!ilty and paid
a fine of $100.00, and his drivers license was revoked for
one year. This was admitted by de.fendant. (Tr. 160-161).
It is a matter of common knowledge that Police or
Highway Patrolmen, do not usually arrest an individual
for a first offense unless an accident has occurred, and it
is very likely that defendant was warned by the Highway
Patrolmen on previous occasions. When the record is carefully examinea, it will be seen that there is no substantial
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evidence to support the courts finding number four, but it
was resorted to by the court in order to offset the courts
finding number two, and thus pave the way for the court
to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, and thus relieve the court
of having to grant plaintiff the relief prayed for in her
- complaint. The court was, under the evidence, not justified or warranted in dismissing plaintiffs complaint with
prejuidce. The judgment as finally made by the court
was in direct conflict to it's previous finding, viz:
"The court feels that a divorce should be granted.
The court finds the parties can never live together
and that a divorce should be granted." (Tr. 206, 207).
Assuming, but not conceding, that the parties were
equally at fault, the court ignored the well known rule that
on grounds of cruelty, the court~, including this Court,
grant the wife a decree of divorce on much less evidence
than they do the husband.
In the case of Doe v. Doe, 48 Utah 200; 158 Pac. 781,
this Court applied this salutary rule:
"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the
ground of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much
less evidence than they do the husband. That rests
on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife
causing her great mental distress, when similar acts
and rconduct on her part may not constitute cruelty
to him, or cause him great mental distress. Before a
decree is granted the husband on such ground, it
ought to be a somewhat aggravated case."
In Hyrup v. Hyrup, 66 Utah 580, 245 P. 335, the rule
· was stated:
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"A husband asking divorce for cruelty because of

"great mental distress" caused by spouse must present
a much stronger and somewhat aggravated case in
comparison with that required of wife asking divorce
on such ground, since wife may be more easily made
to suffer great mental distress."
In Cordner v. Cordner, 61 P. 2d.
re-stated by this Court-

601:~

this rule was

"The adjudged cases show that courts, on the
grounds of cruelty, grant the wife a decree on much
less evidence than they do the husband. That rests
on sound principles, for acts and conduct on the part
of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife
causing her great mental distress, when similar acts
and conduct on the part of a husband may well constitute cruelty to the wife causing her great mental
distress, when similar acts and conduct on her part
may not constitute cruelty to him, or cause him great
mental distress. Before a decree is granted the husband on such ground, it ought to be a somewhat aggravated case."
And in the foregoing opinion the court stated the following rule:
"Two people who cannot adjust themselves should
not by the court be required to maintain a relationship
that has become intolerable to them."
When the rule adhered to in the foregoing cases is
applied to the courts finding two and four, judgment
should be rendered in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for in
her complaint. It is respectfully submitted that the trial
court committed reversible error in its failure and refusal
to grant plaintiff a divorce and the relief demanded in her
complaint.
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Point 2. The Cmtrt erred in making it's finding
number five, "that each of said parties were guilty of
crimination and recrimination, one against the other,"
(R. 7) because there is no pleading or evidence to support the same.
It is respectfully submitted that the defendant did not
plead the defense of recrimination in his answer or counterclaim. In paragraph six of defendant's counterclaim, he
alleges in very general terms that plaintiff's cruel treatment
caused defendant great mental distress, and has made life
with plaintiff impossible. It will thus be seen that defendant was seeking a divorce from plaintiff, as is further
evidenced by the prayer in his counterclaim, viz,- "that
defendant be granted a divorce against the plaintiff."
Thus there was no issue raised by the pleadings,
( R. 2, 3) nor by the testimony of either party, on question
of recrimination. The case was concluded and submitted
to the court on ~1ay 12, 1952. (Tr. 205). The doctrine
of recrimination was, to the surprise of both parties, first
mentioned by the court on June 9, 1952, in announcing it's
decision: ( Tr. 206).
"The court finds both parties guilty of crimination and recrimination, finds all of the allegations and
proof of both parties true and correct, except that the
court finds that Mr. Hendricks was never, within the
issues of the case, a user of narcotics or drugs."
(Tr. 206).
It will thus be seen that by injecting the doctrine of
recrimination in this case aft{}r both parties had submitted
all of the testimony, and the case was closed, the court
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thereby introduced a new theory, not submitted to the
court by either the pleadings or the evidence of either
party.
If a trial court could thus ignore the issues as presented to the court by the pleadings in this case, and introduce a completely new and strange theory not contemplated by either party, then pleadings would serve no purpose and be of no avail. And moreover, if a court could
ignore the issues presented to it by the parties in the case
at bar, then a court could ignore the issues presented by
the pleadings in any case. Such a procedure would completely destroy the orderly conduct and purose of a trial.
Neither counsel ~or client could vouchsafe what the result
of such a· trial might be.
The courts hold that the doctrine of recrimination
must be pleaded in order to be available as a defense.
In Oppeman v. Opperman, 65 N.E. 2d. 655, it was
held by the Ohio Court of Appeals that,"The doctrine of recrimination is recognized as
a defense which must be pleaded in order to be available."
·In the case of Brandt v. Brandt (N.D.) 33 N.W. 2d.
620, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held:
"We conclude, however, that the· general rule is
that recrimination is a defense which must be pleaded
in order to warrant the court in considering it. Young
v. Young, (25 A.L.R. 1049); Jones v. Jones, 18 N.J.
Eq. 33, 90 Am. Dec. 607; Keezer on Marriage and
Divorce, Sec. 805; Nelson on Divorce, 2nd Edition,
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Sec. 10.10; 17 Am. Juris. 314, Sec. 325." xxx "We hold
that recrimination is an affirmative defense to be
availed of only when pleaded and relied on by the
defendant."
In Welch v. Welch (Florida) 152 So. 173, it was
held that,"Recrimination as a bar to divorce otherwise
grantable, except where adultery is the basis of re . .
crimination, should be asserted as an affirmative defense in answer and pleaded with same particularity
as charged in complaint for divorce."
The rule is also concisely stated in 19 C.J. 116, in the
following language:
"As a general rule recrimination, to be available
as a defense, must be set up in the answer. The misconduct must be set out in the answer with the same
particularity as to time, place, and circumstance as is
requU:ed in a complaint for divorce on the same
ground."
In 17 Am. Jur. 314, Sec. 325, the rule is stated:
"Strictly, recrimination is an affirmative defense
which must be specially pleaded or set up in answer
as a defense in order that the defendant may have the
right to give proof of such defense." (Annotation
76 A.L.R. 991- Young v. Young (N.J.) 119 A. 92
25 A.L.R. 1049).
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed reversible error when it introduced the doctrine of
recrimination as a defense in this case and decided the
case upon that theory when it was not either pleaded or
relied upon by the defendant.
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And moreover, the judgment as rendered is unusually
drastic, in providing that it is enterd with prejudice, ( Tr.
214). This is tanamount to placing the parties in a straitjacket. Plaintiff testified that she could not endure to live
with defendant. That it would seriously effect her health
and her sanity. ( Tr.· 44). Thus the court was advised of
her attitude, yet notwithstanding such information he announced: "This dismissal will be with prejudice. I don't
want either of them to file a new lawsuit based on anything in the past. They'll have to go back together and
start fighting again. (Tr. 214).

Point 3. The Court erred in striking the plaintiffs testimony and evidence.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
striking the testimony offered by plaintiff ( Tr. 218-235)
because this evidence definitely disclosed that while the
parties were living together the defendant was consorting
with other women. During the summer of either 1949,
or 1950 ( Tr. 224) plaintiff took some of defendants clothes
to the farm at Lewiston and upon her arrival there found
a Mrs. Stewart of Preston, Idaho, at the home with defendant and they were in an intoxicated condition. Plaintiff had previously heard about Mrs. Stewart having been
at the Lewiston home with the defendant on prior occasions. ( Tr. 224). ·Apparently, when plaintiff entered the
home and found defendant and Mrs. Stewart there, it had
a tendency to sober Mrs. Stewart, since as plaintiff testified, Mrs. Stewart went out of the house "like an antelope."
(Tr. 224). At that time plaintiff had actual knowledge of
what had previously been a rumor. Plaintiff remonstrated
with the defendant, but he was toointoxicated to know
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what she was talking about. (Tr. 225) .. When plaintiff
arrived at the home and found Mrs. Stewart there alone
with the defendant, she felt terrible about it. ( Tr. 225).
Plaintiff remonstrated with defendant at a later time about
his promiscuity with Mrs. Stewart and other women.
(Tr. 225).
The evidence also discloses that defendant received a
letter (Pl. Ex. BB) from a Mrs. J. H. Jones of San Francisco, California, couched in very intimate and endearing
terms. (Tr. 225-227). Plaintiff's Exs. AA, CC and DO
were written by a woman from a neighboring town near
Lewiston. They reveal that a very intimate relationship
existed between herself and the defendant. Exhibit "DD"
refers to defendant's Chevrolet, which he owned and operated prior to purchasing a new 1950 model Chevrolet.
(Tr. 177). From the text of Ex. D,D it definitely appeard
that their relationship covered a considerable period of
time.
Prior to the time the foregoing testimony w-as adduced
the court stated,"but if there's any branch of cruelty we haven't
heard, I propose to hear the nature of it." ( Tr. 217).
The foregoing testimony had not been previously offered during the trial. And this testimony was material
and relevant to prove mental cruelty. The court totally
ignored the foregoing statement when it later granted
defendant's motion to strike this testimony. ( Tr. 235).

Point ·4. The Court erred in refusing to award
to Plaintiff alimony and a property settlement, and in
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making the following portion of finding number three,
viz,- "and used the proceeds thereof mostly for her
own use and benefit.:~' (Tr. 7, 8, 9 ).
The evidence is without dispute in this case that as a
result of this marriage the plaintiff has suffered a serious
property and financial loss. At the time of the marriage
between these parties, the plaintiff owned business property in Logan, from which she was receiving a monthly
rental income of $115.00, and a few months later it was
raised to $125.00, per month. The taxes were about $25.00
per month. (Tr. 56). The evidence disclosed that from
the date of this marriage, in June, 1943, to the summer of
1946, this income aside from taxes was all spent by plaintiff for household expenses because of defendant's failure
to support plaintiff. This is proven by plaintiff's cancelled
checks and bank statements offered in evidence. At the
time of the marriage, plaintiff also owned a share in the
family home and at the time of the sale thereof she received the sum of $1200.00, Tr. 40) and this amount was
also spent for household expenses.
It will thus be seen that during the period of approximately three years while plaintiff was living with the
defendant on his farm at Lewiston, she spent from her
own funds approximately $4,800.00, for household expenses, which became necessary because defendant failed
to provide-support. And during which period of time the
defendant spent very little, if any, of his own funds for that
purpose.
In the summer of 1946, when these parties separated,
plaintiff had no home in Logan, so she purchased the home
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in which she is now residing.

( Tr. 27, 28). And to purchase the same it became necessary to sell her business
property, which was sold in October of 1946, from which
sale she received the net amount of $21,065.00. ( Tr. 29).
From this amount plaintiff paid $6,000.00 for the home,
and approximately $3,000.00 for interior painting and
decorating, carpets, drapes and remodeling. She paid
$2,750.00 for a car and at time of trial she had two war
bonds, net value of $1,640.00, or a total of $13,390.00.
When this amount is subtracted from $21,06500, it leaves
a balance of $7,675.00, all of which was expended. by the
plaintiff for household expenses between October, 1946,
and March 1, 1952 when this action was filed. (Tr. 38, 39).
When this amount is added to $4,800.00, plaintiff has contributed altogether $12,475.00, toward supporting herself
and defendant during their married life of approximately
8 years and 8 months. The evidence thus shows that defendant lived upon the plaintiffs income, which is definitely proven by plaintiff's checks, (Ex. A-0) and her bank
statements offered and received in evidence. And defendant has not denied that the above amount was spent
for family and household expenses.
And while plaintiff was spending her money for family support, resulting in the depletion of her estate, the
defendant'~ property remained intact. He has not lost
anything by way of diminution of property; and the present mortgage on his property was placed there by the
defendant to pay his debts, and that the balance owing
on the principal amount of the mortgage debt is $20,400.00. The evidence further shows that his property is worth
in the neighborhood of $68,000.00. (Tr. 41 ). Mr. Watkins,
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agent and appraiser for Prudential Life testified that the
defendant's farm property was worth $350.00 an acre with
improvements. (Tr. 4, 5). This did not include personal
property such as trucks, automobile, farm machinery and
equipment, nor the warehouse property. Plaintiff testified that about a year ago when defendant intended to
sell the farm, improvements thereon and personal property
to his boys, the sale price was $68,000.00 (Tr. 41). This
contemplated sale did not include the warehouse property.
Defendant testified that this property was worth about
$1,500.00. ( Tr. 170) and it is extremely doubtful that defendant would sell his entire property at this time for less
than $70,000.00.
Thus there is definite proof that when the present
mortgage indebtedness of $20,400.00, is subtracted from
the total worth of defendant's farm property, the net value
thereof is about $50,000.00~ It is rather unusual that plaintiff should be required to spend approximately $12,475.00,
of her money in less than nine years, when the defendant
owned one of the best farms in Lewiston, (Tr. 5) with a
net worth of approximately $50,000.00.
It is respectfully submitted that plaintiff is entitled
to have restored her property holding and earnings hereinbefore referred to, which totals $12,475.00. In addition
to that she should be entitled to permanent alimony.
The general rule provides that the size of the husband's estate is material in fixing the amount of permanent
alimony for the support of the wife. In 19 C. J. 253, Sec·
tion 588, the following rule is stated:
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"Permanent alimony being in the nature of property, the court in awarding it should consider primarily the amount of the husband's property (cases cited).
The estate of the husband which is taken into consideration in fixing the amount of alimony is usually
the estate which he owned at the time of divorce."
This Court has fixed the alimony and property settlement on an amount, equal to one-third or one-half of defendant's estate. The following Utah cases so hold:
In the case of Lyon v.
this court said:

~yon

(Utah) 206 P. 2d. 148,

"The right in lieu of dower in Utah is only onethird to the wife. Strict divisions of property have
gone as high as one-half each."
In the case of Woolley v. Woolley, 112 Utah 391, 195
P. 2d. 743, this court confirmed a settlement made for the
parties by the trial court in the following language:
"The court in its decree provided for the distribution of the property on the following basis: There
was a cash offer of $30,000.00 made for the Cottonwood property and the trial court ordered this sold.
From the proceeds received, the plaintiff was to receive $8,000.00 more than the defendant. Plaintiff
was decreed war savings bonds of the face value of
$10,000.00, and the defendant was awarded the bal. ance of the property. Assuming the Cottonwood property was to sell for $30,000.00, then the distribution
as ordered by the court is as follows: Plaintiff is to
receive $19,000.00 from the· sale of the home and
$10,000.00 from the war bonds, or a total of $29,000.00. In determining generally what a wife is entitled
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to when a divorce decree has been granted to the
husband, we have considered one-third as being a
fair proportion."
It should also be kept in mind that although Mrs.
Woolley was given one-third of the property, the court
granted Mr. Woolley a divorce against his wife on grounds
of mental cruelty. And she had not supported the family
from separate income.
The case of Tremayne v. Tremayne 211 P. 2d. 452,
the trial court awarded plaintiff (wife) the divorce and
, about four-fifths of property acquired during marriage.
On appeal by husband the judgment was affirmed:
In view of the foregoing decisions when applied to the
above stated facts, relative t-o plaintiff's lack of income
and her inability to work ( Tr. 70) and the fact that the
defendant has the ability to work and has a substantial
yearly rental income from the farm of $5,400.00, after
taxes, ( Tr. 164) and he can thus devote his full time to
other employment which should yield a substantial income. When these factors are considered it would seem
fair to both parties,_ if this court award to the plaintiff the
sum of $12,475.00, which she has contributed for house. hold expenses, together with reasonable alimony.
The court erred in its finding (No. 3) that plaintiff
had used most of the proceeds from the sale of her business
property for her· own benefit. The income from said property from the date of her marriage to the date of sale,
amounted to approximately $4,800.00, which was used for
family support. (Tr.57). When this amount is added to the
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net sale price of $21,065.00, the total is $25,865.00. From
that amount plaintiff expended approximately $12,475.00
for household support, which is just a little less than onehalf of $25,865.00. Thus plaintiff used approximately onebaH of the amount of money she received from the income
and sale of business property for her own use, and the
other one-half was used for family support.
Point 5. The court erred in refusing to award
plaintiffs attorney an attorney's fee.
It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in
refusing to make an award for plaintiff's attorney. It was
stipulated and agreed by court and counsel that plaintiff
would not be required to submit proof on the reasonableness of the fee in this case. ( Tr. 76) .
Considering the amount of property involved in this
case and the an1ount of legal services performed in the
preparation and trial of this case and, the services to be
rendered in this appeal, it would seem that an award of
$750.00, would not be excessive. Burtt v. Burtt, 204 P.
91; Openshaw v. Openshaw. 12 P. 2d. 364.
In approving of $750.00, in the Burtt case, this Court
said:
"The record here shows that at the time of the
trial plaintiff was earning a salary of $5,500 per annum. According to plaintiff's own estimate he is possessed of household goods and effects of the approximate value of $2,500, a house and lot in Pasadena of
the value of $3,500 and his liabilities do not exceed
$2,500, including the liabilities incurred by him in
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his efforts to litigate and settle his matrimonial difficulties. Under all the circumstances as disclosed by
the record here, we are not prepared to say that the
district court, in awarding an attorney fee of $750, so
abused its discretion that this court would be justified
in making any intervention. It therefore follows that
the allowance of alimony and the expenses of a trial
of this nature, including attorneys' fees, are largely
matters within
the discretion of the court who tried
,
t he case.
And moreover, when this Burtt case was decided by
this Court in January, 1922, the value of the dollar was
greatly enhanced over the value of the current dollar.
This situation was also true in the year 1932, when
this court decided Openshaw v. Openshaw, supra, yet this
Court approved a fee of $500.00, fixed by the trial court.
In the course of the opinion this ·Court stated:
"It is asserted that there is no evidence to support the finding made by the trial court that $500 is
a reasonable amount to be be paid for the wife's attorney's fee, and that there is no evidence upon which
this court can make an award on that account. We
do not agree with either of these contentions. It is
true that no witness testified as to what is a reasonable
fee to be allowed. But the whole record was before
the trial court. The record dis·closed all facts that
are generally taken into account by the trial courts in
this state in making awards for attorney's fees in
divorce actions. The same facts likewise appear by
the record in this court. Without enumerating them
it is sufficient to say that we think they are ample to
support the finding that a fee of $500 is a reasonable
fee to be paid for the services of plaintiff's attorney
in the trial court.,
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The appellant respectfully submits to this Honorable
Court that the findings, conclusions and judgment of the
trial court be reversed, remanding the case and directing
that the trial court enter findings, conclusions and decree,
awarding to plaintiff a decree of divorce, a reasonable
property settlement, reasonable alimony, attorney's fee
and costs.
L. E. NELSON,
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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